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Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with how biography, memory and identity are 
managed and displayed in a public confession of having been an informer for 
the Securitate (the former Romanian Communist Secret Police). Drawing on 
discursive psychology the analysis reveals how biographical details are 
produced by drawing upon categorizations of people, context and events, and 
organizationally relevant products such as the ‘archive’, the (Securitate) ‘file’, 
‘information notes’ and personal notes. It is suggested that constructions of 
memory and identity are legitimated through a relationship with an 
organizational and personal accomplishment of accountability. The question 
guiding the analysis asks not why, but how remembering assumes the form 
that it does and how, ultimately, it can connect biography, memory and 
identity to the wider ideological context. It is shown that a process of 
(re)writing biography is located in the ‘textual traces’ contained in personal 
and ‘official’ records. Recollections, dispositions, intentions, moral character, 
are intertwined with a textually mediated reality in producing the public 
record of disclosure, the personal and political significance of what is 
remembered.  Key words: biography, discursive psychology, textually mediated reality, identity, memory, public disclosure, Securitate.
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Introduction 
This is a paper about the vagaries of biography, memory and identity in 
Eastern Europe, a paper on personal (and political) identity in a context of 
‘coming to terms with the past’ in political transition. Transition from 
communism to democracy in Eastern Europe has been a period of re-
appraisal and re-affirming of personal/political biographies from under the 
burden and legacy of the communist/post-communist past. One can make a 
distinction between ‘coming to terms with the past’ as a state driven, official 
moral/ideological course of action - a way of dealing with the (traumatic) 
legacy of the past – and ‘coming to terms with the past’ as an individually 
consented, moral/ideological course of action, as a way of dealing with a more 
personal (but nonetheless, political) legacy of the past. Here, I am interested 
in the latter.  
This paper is concerned with the discursive management of biography, 
memory and identity in a letter written by a Romanian public intellectual 
detailing the context and consequences of being an ‘informer’ for the former 
Romanian Communist secret police, the Securitate, sent to one of the most 
important Romanian daily national newspaper. The context in which the 
letter was written was that of the public release of (and access to) the ‘files’ of 
the Securitate, and various other public statements (which I will refer to as 
‘public disclosures’) from politicians, public intellectuals, journalists, clerics 
on their alleged complicity with the Secret police.  
I draw on insights from discursive social psychology (Edwards & 
Potter, 2001; Edwards, 2006; Middleton & Brown, 2005, 2007; Wetherell, 
2007) to analyze such instances of public disclosure as situated, observable, 
accountable discursive products where speakers and writers are seen as 
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engaged in a process of personal reflexive engagement (Smith, 2003) with 
biography, memory and identity. Discursive social psychology is a broadly 
social constructionist approach to social science issues that ‘cuts across the 
traditional disciplinary divisions to provide a rich participant-based 
understanding of action’ (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007, p. 2). Discursive 
psychology treats talk and text as discourse, as ‘primary mean’ through which 
social actions are done and recognizes that issues of knowledge, blame, guilt, 
accountability, are an integral part of a variety of everyday and institutional 
settings. These issues are treated as constitutive features of those settings 
rather than dependent on a putative relationship to a reified perspective on 
either the setting or cognition. Discursive psychology offers a platform to 
critique ‘assumptions of the kind of cognitivism which assumes that the 
explanation of human conduct is dependent on the understanding of prior 
and underlying cognitive processes and entities’ (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007, 
p. 6) 
In this paper I follow discursive psychology’s engagement with analytic 
perspectives reflected in people’s constructions of social life and social 
practices. Discursive psychologists interested in the study of memory start 
from the assumption that memory is ‘a key site where questions of personal 
identity and social order are negotiated’ (Middleton & Brown, 2007, p. 662). 
This is a perspective that takes into account how processes of self-definition, 
accountability and moral character arise in processes mediated by textual 
forms (Smith, 1990a, b). Memory and identity have plural manifestations and 
cannot be easily collapsed into unitary representations or conceptualizations 
(Wertsch, 2002; Wetherell, 2007). The key to understanding these plural 
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manifestations is to locate concerns with memory and identity in individuals’ 
‘own practices of accountability’ (Edwards, 2006, p. 46; Eglin & Hester, 
2003). 
When one starts analysing what happens when people turn themselves 
into ‘socially organised biographical objects’ (Plummer, 2001) one realises 
that the individual is rather like ‘a site, like institutions or social interaction, 
where flows of meaning-making practices or semiosis … become organised’ 
(Wetherell, 2007, p. 668). When analysing individual practices we are bound 
to invoke, in some way or other, the level of institutional and social interaction 
practices. Meaning-making practices become organised within a space that 
gets created at the intersection and interaction between individual and socio-
cultural practices. On one hand, we can, perhaps, refer to the conditions 
surrounding the psychological ratification, legitimation and constitution of 
the individual qua individual (e.g. the various psychological categories 
purporting to describe the person and its internal cognitive functioning), 
whereas, on the other hand, we can refer to a plane where the individual is 
inextricably connected to a world which exists outside itself; a world of social 
practices to which the individual refers, but also constitutes at the same time. 
Memories and identities come into being at the intersection of different 
social practices of remembering and forgetting, and within the nexus of our 
relations to other people, as well as informal and formal institutional settings 
and narratives of the past. Treating identity and memory as social 
accomplishments entails mapping the various cultural resources available to 
individuals to make sense of their own identities and their relationships with 
others in various social situations. When one starts considering the nature and 
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the various personal/political implications of self-disclosures in the public 
sphere, one cannot help noticing that the all-pervading way in which 
individuals engage with the process of re-appraising, re-evaluating memories 
and identities caught in the institutional web of the Securitate is to use oneself 
as an ‘ethnographic exemplar’ (Gergen & Gergen, 2002) to accomplish, what 
some researchers have called, an ‘auto-ethnography’ of the struggle between 
private and public, personal and political memories and identities. It is argued 
that this auto-ethnography cannot be accomplished without relying on a 
documentary version of reality (Smith, 1990a; Prior, 2004). The authoritative 
version contained in the documents and records of the Securitate can be said 
to be a significant dimension of mediation in the (re)creation and (re)writing 
of biographies, memories and identities. Re-evaluating and negotiating 
identity transformation is not just a matter of self-consciously remembering 
facts, but reordering, reinterpreting, re-imagining actors and events, re-
feeling and re-contextualizing experience, establishing new relations and 
perspectives between what one was and what one is. In the public sphere, 
narratives have to be constructed with a view to provide the person with the 
possibility of (re)constituting  a ‘usable past’ that serves some personal, but 
also a political identity project (cf. Wertsch, 2007). As Fine and Fields argue,  
‘narratives are often the means through which individuals engage in the 
self-reflexive process of identity construction. The stories people tell 
about themselves reflect on the self … how people locate themselves in 
space, time, and social networks generates identity for self and others. 
The opposite is also true—the way individuals or groups are situated in 
others’ narrative also works to impose identity from the outside’ (2008, 
p. 139). 
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My concern is with how this re-evaluation and negotiation is publicly 
displayed and what is the upshot of personal recollections and identity 
reappraisal when these become dominated by impersonal and highly stratified 
versions of the past (cf. Middleton & Brown, 2005). 
 
Narratives of guilt and compliance 
The process of soci0-political change and transformation in transition 
and post-transition Eastern Europe has not brought with itself an automatic 
process of memory liberation (Andrews, 2000; Galasinska & Krzyzanowski, 
2009; Tileagã, 2009). Across various sociopolitical contexts, the process has 
been fraught with tensions, dilemmas, paradoxes and ambiguities of memory 
in individuals’ attempts to construct new, viable, acceptable identities for 
themselves, but also for the polity they were inhabiting (see inter alia, 
Konopasek & Andrews, 2000; Gallinat, 2006, 2009).   
One of the main concerns of researchers has been with understanding 
and analyzing the changes of individuals’ biographies, memories and 
identities brought about by political changes. A relevant and close example to 
my current concerns is research conducted by Barbara Miller (1999, 2003) on 
Stasi informers.  She analyses a series of ‘narratives of guilt and compliance’ in 
East Germany attempting to offer a soci0-psychological account of identity 
management and ‘coming to terms’ with a politicized past. These narratives 
are interpreted by using psychological categories and theories such as 
cognitive dissonance, selective memory, and so on, and relying on common 
explanations in terms of socialization, double morality, double standards, 
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accepting political lies. To this, Miller adds the element of ‘social and 
psychological undesirability of having been an informer’ which leads people to 
‘apply a sort of “can’t have been” approach to their own personal history’ 
(Miller, 1999, p. 110). She contends that ‘informers must first identify 
themselves with the terminology used to define their past actions and re-
evaluate and re-define their self-image and personal history in order to 
incorporate these structures’ (ibid., p. 111). But how is, in situ and in detail, 
this identification achieved? What does it entail? It might well be that the 
issue is not merely that of ‘identifying with the terminology used to define 
their past actions…’, but to show how vocabularies (of action, motive, etc.) 
that include or make reference to various technical terms, categories and 
organizationally relevant products (the surveillance ‘file’, ‘information notes’, 
various ‘Reports’, and so on) are actually displayed and deployed in the 
process of re-defining self-image and personal history. While valid within 
their own terms, Miller’s interpretations seem to paper over the issue of how 
narratives of ‘guilt and compliance’ can be conceptualized as social 
accomplishments of individuals in the management of memory and identity, 
public accountability and moral character.  
Narratives of self-image redefinition should not be exclusively seen as 
moves to preserve self-esteem or save face. It is true that ‘since the existence 
of a Stasi file potentially defines the private and public life of former 
informers, the confrontation with this aspect of an individual’s past can 
potentially result for them not simply in a re-acquisition of their biography, 
but in its complete redefinition’ (Miller, 1999, p. 129). But what seems to be 
missing is the question of how is this ‘re-acquisition of biography’ 
accomplished? How is the re-definition of informers’ self-image mediated by 
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organizationally relevant products such as the Secret Police ‘file’, the official, 
and also the personal ‘archive’?  
When one reads narratives of the kind that Miller or I have collected, 
what seems to be at stake is not so much reducing and relativising feelings of 
guilt, but managing ‘moral self-assessment’ (Edwards, 2006) and moral 
accountability, discursively producing disposition and moral character. What 
this observation makes relevant is the importance of considering and studying 
the categories, practices and relations that participants themselves make 
relevant in the course of confronting different aspects of their own past.  
There is always a risk to overstate the power of formal organizations 
(Middleton & Brown, 2005) and their impact in memory’s revision of the past. 
One should not discount the creative practices that provide the seeds for the 
numerous possibilities of resisting the ‘archontic power’ (Derrida, 1997) of the 
Communist state and its secret police: the everyday activity of individuals 
preserving personal notes, various documents, photographs, diaries 
(sometimes, audio or video recordings), developing their ‘own archives as 
memory devices’ (Featherstone, 2006, p. 594). Personal archives, as official 
ones, manage the tension between remembering/forgetting and, in this case, 
an (oppressive) textually mediated reality (Middleton & Brown, 2005; 
Derrida, 1997; Lynch, 1999). 
One cannot hope to understand ‘coming to terms with the past’ as a 
socio-cultural, political and ideological phenomenon if one does not engage 
closely with the relationship that gets established between a person’s 
biography, memory, identity, organizationally relevant products and an 
organizational accomplishment of accountability. It is not enough to 
conceptualize ‘coming to terms with the past’ by hinting to a process of ‘re-
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acquisition’ and redefinition of biography, which, in turn, is described and 
explained in terms of psychological processes and mental states. One also 
needs to understand the nature of this ‘re-acquisition’ and redefinition of 
biography including, but not limited to, how people are (or feel) ‘compelled’ 
by authoritative versions of the past (those mediated by the practices and 
records of the Securitate in this particular case) and the ways in which 
individuals engage in a struggle to recapture, reclaim and rewrite the 
‘archontic’ power of the official ‘record’ of the Securitate.  
Textually mediated reality 
The Securitate (alongside other similar institutions of social control 
and state ruling in Eastern Europe, and elsewhere) can be considered as the 
quintessential example of textually mediated production of domination, 
coercion and oppression in the service of hegemonic political order. For the 
Securitate, the individual was formed as a category of knowledge (Albu, 2008) 
under the aegis of a textually-mediated reality (Smith, 1990b) and network of 
mediated activities (Middleton & Brown, 2005, 2007). This made it possible 
to bind people into a social order and reality represented by the archive and 
hegemonic power of the communist State (Oprea, 2002).  
To have a ‘file’ with the Securitate, to have ‘collaborated’ is linked to an 
organizational accomplishment of accountability creating a special identity 
and moral character for whoever was located in the records. The Securitate 
has created an ‘archontic infrastructure’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005), where 
categories of knowledge, memory and practice, but also individual 
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biographical ‘durations’ become collected as an expression of a relation of 
ruling and of a ruling, institutional/state order (Smith, 1999).  
What I refer to as ‘archontic infrastructures’ (Middleton & Brown 
(2005; Lynch, 1999) are ‘formal assemblies of technical procedures’ 
(Middleton & Br0wn, 2005, p. 177), brought off by ‘technical mediation, the 
embedding of social practices of remembering in formal classifications and 
standards’ (p. 177). What is granted by the infrastructure frames the 
expression and positioning of individual acts of remembering or forgetting. 
The ‘archon’ (the Securitate), is the one that ‘rules’ over the archive, it is 
charged with its safekeeping. In this context, safekeeping does not stem from 
a desire to preserve the past in formal terms, but rather to construct an 
authoritative version of reality that can ultimately control, transform, and 
ultimately, corrupt the individual indexed in the files. The continuous 
maintaining and updating of files on so many people was feeding a broader 
bureaucratic structure, that of the Communist state. To be a person of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania meant that you were irretrievably attached to 
and irremediably defined by that archontic structure. It also meant that, as an 
individual, you were ‘forced’ to engage with that structure (and its internal 
mechanism) in order to make sense of your own memory, biography and 
identity (Middleton & Brown, 2005).  
‘Information surveillance dossiers’, ‘information notes’, ‘reports’ and 
other organizationally relevant products need to be conceived as elements in a 
‘network of relationships’ that gets established between people, practices and 
institutions. Personal/political narratives become defined in relation to an 
 12 
intricate  ‘network of mediated activities’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 147) 
around surveillance and state control.  
The textually mediated reality of Securitate’s various means of 
controlling people can be seen as providing the ‘conceptual framework in 
terms of which the world is reported upon’ (Prior, 2004, p. 379). 
Recollections, stories of identity transformation are mediated by the ‘textual 
traces’ (Smith, 1990b) contained in personal and official records. Being 
categorized or self-categorizing oneself as an ‘informer’, ‘being informed on’, 
or ‘being under surveillance’ relies on a ‘documentary version of reality’ (cf. 
Atkinson & Coffey, 1997; Prior, 2004). Documents, records, and so on, are not 
simply an aid to remembering and identity construction, but mediators of a 
rhetoric of identity and memory. The individual can position this 
documentary version of reality within a personal, biographical time and 
duration, and at the same time, is positioned by it within a flow of practices 
and organizationally accomplished public accountability (Wetherell, 2003). A 
documentary version of reality can also offer a location to speak or write from, 
constituting the person as a reflexive agent putting forward a commentary on 
the tensions between how identity is experienced and how it comes to be 
represented. 
For most people whose complicity with the Securitate was 
‘demonstrated’ in some way or another, there was always a hope that the ‘files’ 
will be able to ‘fill in the gaps in [their] biographical understanding … make it 
whole’ (Miller, 1999, p. 129; see also Kulczycki, 2009). This kind of account 
can be read as pointing to the function of the ‘file’(s) in making biography 
‘whole’, in settling the story of identity transformation. An alternative reading 
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would draw attention to the way we use mediational objects to establish a 
relationship to some aspect of our past (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001), 
to how the inner character of our experiences, identities, memories, practices 
become transformed, transfigured, become ‘extended outwards and reflected 
back at us’, that is, ‘objectified’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 672, italics in 
original). As Prior (2004) argues, ‘documents are never inert … they 
frequently serve as active agents in schemes of human interaction – agents to 
be recruited, manipulated, scorned or hidden’ (p. 388).  
 
Data and analytic approach 
 
As we know from many other socio-political contexts (the McCarthy era 
in the United States; South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation; 
Stasi informers in East Germany), detection and disclosure is certain to bring 
with it various forms of identity transformation. One can understand the 
socio-psychological dynamics of identity, memory and biography 
reconstruction in such contexts only if one treats identity transformation as a 
subtle, situated, social accomplishment, a matter for members of society to 
negotiate and make sense of. To the issue of how individuals retroactively 
remember and interpret their past (and engage with) personal (and political) 
history one needs to add the question of how remembering, biography and 
memory are being reconstituted, displayed and entangled in a space of public 
visibility and accountability. Recollecting personal past experience is suffused 
not only with our and others’ words and experiences, but also with a range of 
‘mediating artefacts’ that can be used for various purposes, including as 
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‘evidential basis for various inferential claims’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 
143). These mediating artefacts (whether of personal or institutional nature) 
bear the mark of the personal and social/ideological/institutional context of 
creation and use.  
A discursive social psychological approach (Edwards, 2006; Middleton 
& Brown, 2005; Wetherell, 2007) can help one understand how individuals 
engage with memory and identity in talk and text as a social accomplishment, 
public, accountable practice. I draw on a kind of discourse analysis that 
attempts to describe configurations of identity, memory and biography at the 
intersection of textually mediated reality (Smith, 1990b) and networks of 
mediated activities  (Middleton & Brown, 2005, 2007). Discursive and 
sociocultural psychologists have been among the first to understand that 
memory, remembering and forgetting ‘is better understood as a site of 
contestation between competing voices than as a body of information that is 
somehow encoded, stored and retrieved’ (Rowe, Wertsch & Kosyaeva, 2002, 
p. 99; cf. also Middleton & Brown, 2005; Wertsch, 2002; Brockmeier, 2002). 
Stories of identity, memory and biography are an integral part of who we are, 
and they are, at the same time, action oriented and rhetorical, attending to 
issues of action, agency, motive, accountability, alternative readings and 
identities (cf. Edwards, 1997).  
Data for this paper come from a letter sent by a Romanian public 
intellectual to a major Romanian newspaper, a ‘confession’ of having been an 
informer for the Securitate. Data are part of a wider project looking at the 
politics of ‘regret’, the social production of disclosure and reconciliation with 
the past in public avowals of ‘collaboration’ with the Securitate from an 
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extensive collection of public statements made by politicians, public 
intellectuals, journalists, and clerics on their complicity with the Communist 
Secret police between 2000 and 2009. Although public statements of ‘regret’ 
could be found even before the year 2000 (for instance, the confession of a 
well-known public intellectual, Alexandru Paleologu, who soon after the 
Revolution confessed having ‘collaborated’ with the Secret Police), most of the 
public statements featured in media and news interviews, newspaper articles, 
letters sent to newspapers, radio and television panel debates, acquired 
prominence with the creation of The National Council for the Study of the 
Securitate Archives’ (CNSAS) and the public being granted free access to the 
archives of the former Securitate.  
The letter is divided by the writer in two parts - the ‘Essence’ (see 
Tileagă, 2009 for a discourse analytic account of the ‘Essence’) and the 
‘Existence’. The letter is described by the newspaper as a ‘harrowing 
document’. It is placed under ‘Current affairs’ (Actualitate) with the gist 
prefaced by the author’s name: ‘Am turnat la Securitate’ (I have been an 
informer for the Securitate). One can note an apparent reversal of Sartre’s 
Existentialist principle: ‘existence precedes essence’. For existentialists, 
existence and actuality come first, essence being derived afterward. Although 
the ‘essence’ of the matter comes first (‘I have been an informer’), the 
‘existence’ is the most elaborate account, takes the most part of the letter. The 
letter (and disclosure contained in it) is suggestive of an identity 
transformation. This can be likened to a self-degradation ceremony (see 
Garfinkel, 1956 on degradation ceremonies). The essence of a self-degradation 
ceremony is: I call upon you to bear witness that I am not what I appear! 
From the outset the writer declares himself to be a certain sort of degraded 
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person, a person of a lower identity in the relevant group's scheme of social 
types – an ‘informer’. This self-degradation can be seen as displacing identity 
into the public sphere, opening the self to others, to a public space of 
judgment.  
The letter (and especially its second part, the ‘Existence’) signals that it 
is time to take stock and re-visit the biographical and commemorative 
underpinnings of that identity transformation (including the transformation 
process itself). The ‘Existence’ offers a chronological/biographical journey – 
from the first encounters with the Securitate, through becoming an informer 
to, ultimately, being put ‘under surveillance’. The gist of the ‘Essence’, that can 
be summarized as ‘I have signed an engagement of collaboration and with the 
Securitate … and I informed the Securitate in writing about some of my 
friends and acquaintances … without confessing and without apologizing’, is 
not the whole story. The biographical trail of identity transformation is 
opened up in the ‘Essence’ but is expanded and contextualised in the 
‘Existence’. The analysis considers extracts from the ‘Existence’ where 
concerns with biography, memory, identity and a documentary version of 
reality are made relevant by the writer as the story unfolds.   
 
Analysis 
Whereas the relevant concern of the ‘Essence’ was to place on the 
‘record’ having been an informer, one of the main concerns of the ‘Existence’ 
was the issue of becoming an informer. ‘My first encounters with the 
Securitate’ and ‘How I became an informer’ are both subheadings of early 
sections of the letter. Together with the categories first introduced in the 
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‘Essence’, these subheadings can be said to trigger the selection and 
identification of relevant descriptions of context (spatio-temporal), the cast of 
characters, activities, responsibilities, organizationally and personally relevant 
products, and relationships between these elements. What is immediately 
relevant is the accountability of past actions: not only how things happened, 
but also when (in relation to the biography of the writer), where, and in 
relation to whom? Extract 1 is an example of these concerns. 
Extract 1 
“On the 24th February 1976, whilst I was in the 12th grade, the County 
Council Iasi of the Ministry of the Interior, Division I/Youth has emitted a 
single copy, strictly confidential document signed by lt.maj. Viziteu Florin … 
On the 2nd of March 1976, lt.col. Rotaru writes “There are grounds for 
cautioning”. Another lt.col. writes “Agree”, without a date. On the 3rd of 
March 1976, the proposal is approved by a colonel with an indecipherable 
signature … The reference to the document “S” send by I.J. Bacau 
corroborates my suspicion that I had a DUI1, maybe from December 1974 … I 
was finally called at Securitate, at its headquarters on Triumfului Street – a 
name which always seemed to me enormously cynical. On the 29th March 
1976, I was getting to Triumfului Street with some courage, hoping that I 
would be able to get away with yet again a “serious warning”, formulated in an 
official setting … I don’t know if it was then that I signed the informer 
engagement, but it is for sure that it is then that I yielded to pressures and I 
have become a snitch. Probably at the same time I have received the 
conspirational name “Valentin”. Anyway, I have found at CNSAS2 the 
following olograph document, undated (it is probably from the 29th March 
1976), which I cite in its entirety, correcting tacitly two-three small errors …”    
  
In extract 1, very specific details are offered – references to dates, 
persons, places and documents. The relevance of what gets mentioned in the 
story of becoming an informer is given by the ‘categorial resources made 
available by the initial characterization of the event’ (Eglin & Hester, 2003, p. 
13). But the identity of the narrator is also at stake. As Lynch and Bogen argue, 
‘the relevant identity of the narrator, the legitimacy of his actions and the 
extent of his responsibility for those actions are made … apparent by his 
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selection and arrangement of terms describing the setting and series of events 
in the story’ (1996, p. 166).  
The personae relevant to the story are the Securitate officers. They are 
personalized, identified, made relevant to the story and the biography of the 
narrator. They have names, responsibilities, hierarchically positioned within 
an organizational framework. More importantly, they are presented as 
standing in some relation to organizationally relevant products (‘strictly 
confidential’ documents) and activities (agreeing on courses of action, etc.). In 
so doing the writer provides instructions for making his becoming an 
informer rationally accountable and understandable in the context of 
Securitate’s activities. Organizationally relevant categories and category-tied 
activities provide for the relevance of the responsible actors and trajectories of 
action related to ‘becoming an informer’. Organizationally relevant products  
(the documents signed by the Securitate officers; the cross-referenced 
document ‘S’; the DUI – ‘Information Surveillance Dossier’; the olograph 
document) are adduced as a resource for pointing to the kind of activity being 
undertaken by the Securitate (surveillance, recruitment, etc.). 
Although some details provided are presented as biographically 
relevant (‘On the 24th February 1976, whilst I was in the 12th grade…’) and 
carefully remembered, the actual detail of having signed the ‘engagement’ at 
the Securitate headquarters is apparently, ‘not remembered’: ‘I don’t know if 
it was then that I signed the informer engagement, but it is for sure that it is 
then that I yielded to pressures and I have become a snitch. Probably at the 
same time I have received the conspirational name “Valentin”’. The document 
is introduced into the story with ‘anyway’, as a seemingly separate dimension 
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from the previously told story. ‘I have found…’ implies a dimension of 
discovery. The document was present in the archives to be reckoned with, but 
needed to be discovered first and then put to use. The document is, in a way, 
invoked to help settle the matter. But the issue is not that of the actual detail 
(of what he did or did not do at the time), but how his identity was 
transformed, what he eventually became, an ‘informer’ for all (organizational) 
practical purposes! Through a reflective commentary (‘it is probably from the 
29th March 1976’), the document attesting the transformation is positioned in 
a network of relevant biographical details. Only identified (with a date, source 
and author) can it be linked with the biography of the writer and the process 
of identity transformation. One can see how, through their use, the Securitate 
records as organizationally relevant products mediate the constitution of a 
relation between the identity and biography of a person and an organizational 
accomplishment of accountability. They constitute an identity and moral 
character for whoever is located in the record.  The identity of the narrator, 
the character and gist of the story, the relevance of what is already on the 
record and what is becoming the record is posited on that relation.  
Extract 2 
“I don’t remember whether and about whom I was asked immediately for 
information notes. But I have found at CNSAS an Annex Report Note to nr. 
00592/7 from 18.01.1979 written by cpt. Campeanu Corneliu, counter-
information officer of U.M. 01241 Ineu (where I completed my military service 
between October 1978 and March 1980) the following paragraphs: On 
29.03.1976 Antohi Sorin was recruited as a collaborator of the Securitate 
organ receiving the conspirational name of ‘Valeriu’ (in fact, ‘Valentin’; my 
note) and has been used for information surveillance at the professional 
training course of Tehnoton plant in Iasi … Antohi Sorin has provided a 
number of ten information notes from 16.04.1976 to 15.05.1978, all containing 
general information about the general mood of the class.”  
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Once the category ‘snitch’, (‘informer’) is on the record, category-tied 
activities, such as writing ‘information notes’ become relevant, appear on cue 
(Eglin & Hester, 2003; Sacks, 1995). One can notice how retrospective 
knowledge claims are handled in sensitive ways (see Edwards, 1997) and 
organizationally relevant products are there to substantiate the point (‘I don’t 
remember if and about whom … but I have found at CNSAS an Annex Report 
Note…’). As was the case with extract 1, the document is not a simple aid to 
remembering ‘forgotten’ details, but rather a mediating tool between the 
person’s identity and biography and an organizational accomplishment of 
accountability. The document is not presented unaccompanied by a reflective 
commentary. We find out that ‘Ineu’ is the name of the place where the writer 
has completed his military service (dates are relevant, biography is on the 
record, again) and that his conspirational name is in fact ‘Valentin’ and not 
‘Valeriu’ (the name in the document is treated as a small mistake, but one 
without consequence). What is especially relevant in this case is the detail of 
the number of information notes written and the nature of their content. The 
document becomes significant for the inferences on the moral character of the 
person that it makes available (and is invoked to substantiate his other claim 
from the ‘Essence’, of not having harmed/injured anyone of those on whom he 
provided information notes)3.   
‘I don’t remember …’ (‘I don’t know …’ in extract 1) do not imply that 
whatever is not remembered was previously known. Such expressions have 
been seen as useful ‘evasive manoeuvres’ (Edwards, 1997) and not a report of 
the writer’s cognitive state (Lynch & Bogen, 1996). Although the narrator 
might be seen as evading remembering directly and faithfully the issue of how 
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many notes were written and what was their tone and content, apparently, the 
matter of the issue is not evaded, but it is substantiated with reference to a 
relevant organizational product (an annex to a report). In this way, personal 
memory is indexed as ‘practically unavailable’ (Lynch and Bogen, 1996) for 
scrutiny.  
In both extracts, the archive is a potential place of discovery 
(Featherstone, 2006), from where biographically and institutionally relevant 
products can be carefully selected to support the perspective offered by the 
narrator. We are not told about when and how discoveries took place, but 
what is important are the inferences that can be drawn from the adduced 
evidence with regard to dispositions, intentions, moral character of the 
person. The narrator can point to documents for the inferences they make 
available. There is a clear sense that documents are being called upon not 
simply as props to a sluggish and failing memory, but tailored precisely for the 
occasion of their use and with regard to the current concerns, in-the-writing of 
the story. In the apparent ‘absence’ of personal memories, documents 
constitute and at the same create a ‘public standard of memorability’ (Lynch 
and Bogen, 1996).  
Extract 3 “From Autumn of 1976, the Securitate officer who was in charge of me was a certain lt. Rotaru Vasile … I have found in one of my notebooks a note from 6 October 1976 from which one can infer that lt. Rotaru has been already looking for me: ‘I am increasingly concerned regarding my future. How on earth could I escape through their fingers?’. On the 2nd of December I was writing that I was on Triumfului street to see lt. Rotaru, bumping into a colleague who was there for the same ill-fated reason; I quote: ‘Despicable thing, but if, forced, I have joined the game, there is nothing I can do’. On the 14th of December 1976 I was to meet lt. Rotaru, at 10, in what looked like a bachelor’s flat (his? a conspirative house?), just opposite ‘Cotnari’ restaurant. I have found a more elliptic mention on the same Rotaru towards the end of January 1977” 
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It was previously noted that the records of the Securitate crop up in the 
story for the kind of inferences they make available. But it is not only an 
official documentary reality that fulfills this function, but also one of a more 
personal nature (the narrator’s own ‘memory devices’: personal notebooks 
and personal notes contained therein). Official documents, as well as personal 
notes can be considered as the foundation and interface that helps the 
narrator engage with its own ‘dilemmas of remembering’ and offer a 
commentary on his own identity transformation.  
The rhetoric of ‘discovery’ in extract 3 is similar to the one identified in 
the first two extracts. This time it is the personal archive that is a potential 
place of discovery. Through a temporal shift, personal notes written at the 
time seem to offer access to a world of thinking, feeling and identity and can 
be seen as resources used to manage the distance/separation between 
individual experience, identity and events from the past. The facts of the 
matter are not simply remembered, but, in a way, ‘re-thought’ or ‘re-felt’ to 
use Shotter’s (1990) terms. It can be argued that this ‘re-thinking’ of 
experience relies on what might be termed a lay self-perception theory: ‘I have 
written those things down at the time, so that’s how I must have felt at the 
time/that’s how I was reacting to what was happening at the time’. If I was 
‘concerned about my future’ and ‘how to escape them’ it must have been 
because the Securitate, through lt. Rotaru, were after me’. Notice how the 
cited personal notes make reference to mental states (‘I was concerned …’) 
and also contain moral positioning and evaluations (Despicable thing, but …’) 
that make available various inferences related the writer’s moral character and 
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its agency. Using personal notes can be seen as a strategic attempt to make 
moral emotions (that carry inferences for moral character) available and 
explainable to both anonymous and non-anonymous parties (cf. Sacks, 1995), 
and position personal recollections into a (psychological) narrative of identity 
that can counter, as it were, the official version of the Securitate and manage 
the concerns of a potentially doubting, suspicious audience/readership.  
References to personal notes not only offer an alternative construction 
of ‘facts’, but also an alternative, moral-psychological perspective on the self, 
one which is not present in the ‘official’ records.  What is contained in 
personal notes offers a glimpse into a psychological world of feelings and 
moral emotions. There is also a sense that this is evidence ‘unlooked for’, 
which is to offer a version of events and actors ‘as not having been worked up 
artfully’ for the present argument (cf. Edwards, 2003, p. 34).  
 The narratives offered are not just examples of a struggle that involves 
the self-in-the-past versus the-self-in-the-present (see Murakami, 2007) or 
the ‘irresolvable tension’ created as individuals ‘attempt to understand their 
continually changing states’ (Phillips, 2007, p. 459). In the particular case of 
having ‘collaborated’ with the Securitate, the narrator shows an orientation to 
how describing the past is not a neutral matter, but implicates a range of 
potential (and sometimes, competing) accountable descriptions associated 
with being a certain type of person. He designs his account in ways that attend 
to the accountability of his own (and other people’s) actions and moral 
character4.  
Extracts 4 and 5 express the dilemma of remembering, identity and 
biography in which the writer is caught. The social order that the relation 
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between an individual’s identity and biography and a personal/organizational 
accomplishment of accountability engenders is, for all practical purposes, a 
moral order where inferences in terms of dispositions, moral nature, desires 
or intentions (cf. Edwards, 2006) are, potentially, publicly ratifiable by 
readers. 
 
Extract 4 “I am convinced now, as I was then, that the Securitate was comparing my notes with information collected by other means, including electronic surveillance. That simple comparative exercise would have demonstrated them on whose side I was, because I wasn’t reporting the radical positions expressed by my friends … on the phone, in public, in correspondence. Only the re-finding of my Securitate dossiers (or theirs) from that time will bring a little emotional balance. Until then, only penitence and persistence in a sentiment of culpability is left for me, one that I had always experienced towards them” 
 
Extract 5 “I had a last plan to run over the border shortly after finishing my military stage, with the help of former comrades, which I trusted. But the plan did not materialize somehow, in the end, they haven’t left either … But I hadn’t had the courage to flee. I resigned to a lowest order morality, trying never to give information that would truly injure someone’s interests, be it a friend or simple acquaintance. When the dossiers regarding the 1980-1982 period will surface, I shall be able to prove this claim; I shall be able to complete the story that I start telling now. Until then, everything remains a simple excuse of an informer.” 
  
 In the ‘Essence’ the writer has been concerned with constructing 
‘disposition and intention as a way to fend off possible implications of being 
seen as someone who would deliberately give information to the Securitate’ 
(Tileaga, 2009, p. 183). As other researchers have shown, there are ‘moral 
ambiguities condensed in memories’ about the socialist past (see Gallinat, 
2009). The relationship to the past is an unfinished business and, in this 
particular case, the past and the identity of the person can only be made whole 
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through the mediation of a documentary reality: the ‘re-finding’ of Securitate 
dossiers (extract 4) and the surfacing of ‘dossiers regarding the 1980-1982 
period’ (extract 5).  
 As mentioned earlier, the essence of a self-degradation ceremony is 
inviting others to witness that the person is not what it appears to be. But this 
self-degradation ceremony is not to be seen as an all-or-nothing process, a 
closed circuit of confession, guilt and remorse. The individual can also 
challenge, resist, or subvert the terms under the auspices of which it appears 
to and is judged by others.  There is a sense that the label and negative 
inferences on moral character will stick until further documentary evidence is 
brought into play. One’s ‘own word’ can be interpreted as an apologia for what 
one was, a strategic excuse or justification of past behavior. It is implied that 
only documents (a documentary version of reality) can bring salvation! The 
narrator’s individual moral standing in the eyes of the others (especially his 
friends and acquaintances) is upheld by the implicit recognition that an 
ethical person is one that is not only passing judgments and critically assessing 
his own identity and biography, but also prepares itself to have judgment 
passed/expressed by others. This can be seen as the very foundation of an 
‘ethics of relationships’ (Gallinat, 2009; see also Margalit, 2002). 
Although a very thorough ‘commemorative triage’ (Middleton & Brown, 
2005) was deployed, the personal story does not seem to be complete; there is 
a sense that essential rather peripheral details are still missing. And there is a 
sense that further evidence can only come from the ‘archive’.  It can be argued 
that it is the ideological nature and factual import of ‘new’ documents that 
makes them indispensable. What is not present, not yet available, but could 
potentially become the record is more significant than what is already on the 
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record. The written record seems to take precedence over members’ own 
recollections (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997)5. At a more general level, Extracts 4 
and 5 point to an ongoing tension between lived experience (and its appraisal 
by individuals) and experience as captured, reproduced, recycled, in 
organized/institutional state systems of surveillance6.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have sought to examine the relationship that gets 
established between a person’s identity, memory and biography, 
organizationally relevant products and a personal/organizational 
accomplishment of accountability. I have argued that it is this relationship 
that mediates the reconstruction of personal history and moral character.   
I have analyzed extracts from a letter written by a Romanian public 
intellectual containing a confession of ‘collaboration’ with the Romanian 
Communist Secret Police. Throughout the letter, the writer seems to be 
engaged in a process of ‘personal reflexive engagement’ (Smith, 2003), 
reconstructing a story of identity transformation by relying on both official 
and personal (organizationally) relevant products. The ‘archontic 
infrastructure’ of the Securitate and its operative archives is conceived and 
oriented to as a source and authoritative producer of official narratives, a 
formal mechanism that ensures formal control over individualized definitions 
of the past and the person. Akin to an ethnographer, the narrator retains the 
right to shift between the reflective commentary (the perspective of personal 
memory) and that of the organizationally ratified document, in order to 
compare and contrast the personal ‘inside’ and the organizational ‘outside’. 
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Official documents and personal notes become ‘dialogical objects’, integral 
part of a conversation with the personal and political past. Invested with 
meaning and biographical relevance, they represent symbolic resources in the 
process of activating a reflexive/dialogical self (Bertau, 2007). They mediate 
the process of (re)constituting identity and memory by objectifying and 
(re)connecting the two at different points in time. Documentary evidence 
(whether personal or official) not only furnishes evidentiary sources for the 
narrative, but also makes a range of inferences available. It also points, 
reflexively, to the supra-individual accountability of the Securitate and its 
methods of information production, storage and control. ‘Mea culpa’ is not 
just a simple confession of guilt or remorse; it is part of a process of re-writing 
of identity and memory, a process that involves (and at the same time, 
constitutes) the various relationships and tensions that get established 
between individual and social/organizational memory.  
 
 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the 
public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.  
 
Notes 
1. Dosar de Urmarire Informativa - ‘Information Surveillance Dossier’ 
2. Consiliul National pentru Studiul Arhivelor Securitatii –‘The National Council for the Study 
of the Securitate Archives’ 
3. The issue of ‘not having harmed/injured anyone’ by writing and providing information 
notes to the Securitate (and its relevance for the construction of the moral character of the 
informant) is a pervasive feature in many public accounts of ‘collaboration’ in Romania (but 
also in other countries too) and merits a separate analysis that goes beyond the scope of this 
paper.   
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4. Notice how place formulations are used as a way of organizing the telling of the story (Eglin 
and Hester, 2003) - the reference to ‘Triumfului street’, previously identified as the Securitate 
headquarters, the ‘bachelor flat’, who throws yet more questions (Rotaru’s own? Or a 
‘conspirational’ house?). Place formulations also provide for the accountability of persons and 
actions: where, with whom and doing what, is usually a paramount concern of surveillance 
work. 
5. New ‘discoveries’ do not offer any default guarantees as to how the person and his/her acts 
are going to be perceived, and ultimately judged, by others. The discovery of potentially 
significant facts depends, on one hand, upon ‘the contingent status of the fragments that 
found their way into the archive’ (Featherstone, 2006, p. 594), and on the other hand, access 
(free or restricted) to the archives of the Securitate. 
6. Middleton and Brown argue that there is always, an all-present ‘tension between what is 
recalled and forgotten by technical mediation and the live concerns of members whose 
remembering practices are obliged to pass by way of such mediation’ (2005, p. 164). 
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